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TOP SECRET

W. J. ... BYEMAN ONLY

CORONA/ARGON

TCS-11730/62-KH
LS/PAD/NPIC-38
4 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl

SUBJECT : Meeting in Dr. Scoville's Office on Problem of Legitimatizing Photography from Satellites.

1. Meeting attended at your request was at 0930, 3E14 Langley.

Present: Dr. Scoville, General Phil Strong, Col. James Cunningham and undersigned.

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2. Propose: To discuss problem to date for information and to provide General Strong with guidance for position at meeting of the Furnas Committee (at 1145 hrs. this morning), said Committee meeting to develop ideas for the Special Group meeting tomorrow. A proposal is underway to legitimize photography from satellites. McNamara and State are said to have agreed that this is desirable if means can be worked out (perhaps the DCI had also agreed, though this was not certain). The purpose of such a move would be to build up support among other nations for the legitimacy of photographic satellites before the USSR launches protests (in or out of the UN) or before one of ours is brought down by the Soviets, with attendant propoganda. In other words, to prepare a climate and develop a body of world opinion in favor of satellite photography.

3. Furnas's procedure is to start with paper developed in September 1960 (Leghorn's project) and bring it up to date. This has these fundamental premises:

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(1) Photography would not be classified and (2) would be available to the world for peaceful purposes; (3) intelligence information derived from exploitation of the photography would be classified.

4. It was feeling that the Discoverer could not be kept black for long; that it was already "grey", that the USSR knew its functions and that the western press was asking more and more questions.

5. Scoville's position, which included contributions from Strong and may be summarized as follows:

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A. GO SLOW in releasing material; TIROS now, later selected examples of poor resolutions, and always keeping release below the state of the art.

B. Develop two or three projects of international usefulness, such as break-up of Arctic Ice.

C. Perhaps bring in mapping and geodesy and use ARGON. (KOVDA (phonetic) at UNESCO recently has had words on satellites for mapping and geodesy; this should be followed up; also other info out of UN which we may not be getting in cables or otherwise timely basis). (Name Dryden mentioned).

6. STRONG will provide copies of pertinent documents for Lundahl's information.

7. The following attended the previous meeting of the Furnas Committee, 29 March 62. All attendees did not possess appropriate clearances and discussion was accordingly hampered. This morning's meeting may see other

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
TCS-11730/62-KH

people there.

Howard Furnas, Chairman
STATE, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary for
AE and Outer Space.

Leslie H. Brown, State
Howard Wiederman, State
Joseph W. Scott, State
Col. Robert Ackerley, JCS
Col. Thomas W. Wolfe, OSD
Col. Ernest F. John, OSD
Lt. Col. Herron, O/SEC. of AF

STAT



In my opinion this action is a great
mistake. We are stirring up trouble
for the US.
DSC

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DATE

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

J APR 62

TO:

MR. LUNDANL

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

THESE COPIES
FROM GEN. STRONG,
THIS MORNING.

He will call you.

FROM:

[Redacted]

STAT

ROOM NO.

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EXTENSION

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Mr. Lundahl

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3/29/62

Lt. Col. Thomas J. Herron
Office of Secretary of Air Force
Office of Missiles and Satellites

SI, T, KH, C, A

Col. Ernest F. John
Office of Secretary of Defense
Office for International Security Affairs

TS

Col. Thomas W. Wolfe, OSD
Office for International Security Affairs

SI, T, KH, C, A

Col. Robert Ackerley, JCS

TS

Joseph W. Scott, INR
State Department

SI, T, KH, I, C, A

Mr. Howard Wiedemann, INR
State Department

SI, T, KH

Mr. Leslie H. Brown, INR
State Department

SI, T, KH, I, C, A

Mr. Howard Furnas
Deputy Special Assistant to Secretary for
AE and Outer Space
Department of State

SI, T, KH

Distg 4/4/62 (all T, KH, C, A)

Barry, Philip J SAE/State
Newbert, Joseph W RSB/State
Brown, Leslie H. INR/State
Skouritz, Charles C. KSP/State
Col. Wolfe, Thos. W., ISA/OSD
Lt. Herron, T. J., SAE/MS.

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Working Analyses

1. Pros and cons of conducting a secret military launching program versus announcement and registration of each shot. (Defense and State)
2. Legal and parliamentary position. (Being prepared separately)
3. Public posture - by President and U.S. Government to foster general acceptance of legitimacy of observation satellites. (State)
4. Extent to which photography needs be released. Timing, type and quantity of photography so released. (State, CIA).

Papers for 9 April meeting at State.

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State - 1962 (Mar?)

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Draft Position Paper on
Political and Public Relations Aspect
of SAMOS and Related Space Activities

THE PREMISE

To develop a new and more effective policy on handling the political and public relations aspects of US conduct of SAMOS and related space activities.

DISCUSSION

The recent unfortunate publicity in the United Kingdom press concerning US reconnaissance satellite activities raises again the question of what kind of political approach (including public relations handling) to these programs will best serve over-all US objectives. Our present policy calls for minimum disclosure and low-key treatment of information and appears, in effect, an attempt to conduct them on a clandestine basis. However, many of the facts of our programs are public knowledge, and, as a result, there has been a considerable amount of sensational press treatment of US "spy in the sky" activities. We have so far been fortunate that no serious political attacks have been made by the Soviets or others on SAMOS and similar programs. The recent disclosures, however, indicate that we will have increasing difficulty in

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maintaining the covert character of our reconnaissance satellite activities. Moreover, it is doubtful that secrecy is the best policy in the light of general political objectives with respect to disarmament, the peaceful uses of outer space, and US-USSR relations.

Secrecy and refusal to acknowledge the general nature of SAMOS and related space activities impose certain penalties upon us by giving these programs a political vulnerability they do not now have. The President and other senior US officials will be asked increasingly direct questions about our satellites, their payloads, photographic and other coverage of the USSR, and the use of the end product. Denials or evasive answers to these questions can trap us into a position where we could suffer serious embarrassment comparable to that which was experienced at the time of the U-2 exposure. This kind of public posture on the part of the US might even make it possible for the Soviets to shoot these satellites down with impunity when they obtain an anti-satellite capability:

of course they will not?

- a. Our secrecy regarding these activities whose existence is evident gives them a "cloak and dagger" aspect and has the appearance of conceding that they are illicit and can only be done clandestinely;

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b. Unless we ourselves give credibility to Soviet charges of illicit activity, SAMOS flights are not vulnerable from a political standpoint in the same sense as the U-2 because (1) they are clearly in outer space as distinct from air space with its association with national sovereignty, (2) the General Assembly has unanimously passed a resolution endorsing the principle of freedom of the use of space for activities in conformity with international law, and (3) SAMOS does not depend on foreign bases on which the Soviets can bring pressure;

c. If we maintain secrecy on such flights, the satellites will be "ghosts" as far as the world is concerned, and our protests in the event of physical Soviet attack on them will have an air of unreality. Yet if these activities are not done at one of the extremes of arbitrary secrecy or a provocative glare of publicity, the activities are so remote and abstract once the launch is finished that there is little basis for opponents to stir up a sense of concern.

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The United States cannot expect this problem to disappear if we just keep quiet. Indeed, at present we have given the Soviets the opportunity to surface the matter at a time and in a manner most to their own interest. For one thing, the UN Outer Space Committee which began its meetings this week will consider and report on the legal problems which may arise from the exploration and use of space. In addition, the matter of registration of launchings has already created a problem for us because, under present criteria, the Glenn orbital flight must be omitted from our submission. While there is justification for such an omission in view of the tremendous amount of information already made available and the fact that the orbit has been terminated, its absence will raise questions.

Thus, if we believe or wish to claim that the ultimate justification of space observation programs is the wrongness of Soviet secrecy and the rightness of an open world, recourse to ostentatious secrecy of our own is counterproductive. On the other hand, publicity regarding SAMOS et al is as bad as an attempt at secrecy; among other things, it can be provocative in forcing Soviet statements of opposition as well as creating the impression of an aggressive U.S. approach. But

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it is possible to strike an intermediate course avoiding both provocative publicity and a clandestine approach.

We can build a politically defensive approach based on openness along the lines of:

- a. The freedom of space concept endorsed by the United Nations;
- b. Discretion but not secrecy in the public relations aspect;
- c. Reasonable public information on the non-military uses of space observation including arms control and meteorological applications;
- d. In UN registration, a general characterization of SAMOS and similar satellites (e.g., "Development and use of space-based observation capabilities") which will not discriminate between purposes of different vehicles or between stages of development.

Such a course of action would remove a major disadvantage of our present policy which leaves to our opponents the initiative in deciding when and how the wraps may be removed from our operations in circumstances of maximum political loss to us. In any event, there appears no satisfactory means of

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long conducting SAMOS and related programs covertly. Thus to acknowledge the general nature of SAMOS and related programs, to announce and provide certain basic data on launches, and to make available scientific information collected is to capitalize on their peaceful, non-aggressive character. A further step might be to offer services based upon such a capability to the United Nations for peace-keeping or scientific purposes. In this way considerable political capital could be built up against any possible Soviet political or military efforts to inhibit our use of the capability.

Pursued in a restrained and matter-of-fact manner, a policy of openness would demonstrate our non-aggressive intent, weaken Soviet political attack, encourage general acceptance of or acquiescence in the use of observation satellites, and be consistent with our objectives in the peaceful use of outer space. Such a policy might have important additional benefits if it could be employed to demonstrate to the USSR that in the space age openness is inevitable and the secrecy of their closed society is a wasting asset.

It must be recognized, however, that a number of disadvantages are involved in treating reconnaissance satellite

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programs with less secrecy than at present. Unless handled in a careful, low-key fashion, the character and timing of a shift toward more openness might force the Soviets to make an issue of our activities and to initiate political attacks which they have so far largely avoided. Certain specific technical information on our satellites may make it easier for the Soviets to take anti-satellite action when they develop such a capability, to take action (e.g. camouflage, concealment) to handicap seriously the satellites' ability to collect intelligence. Such measures would presumably be very costly and time-consuming and might not be entirely successful, but careful study of the implications for our deterrent capability would be required.

On balance, however, it appears that it would now be in the U.S. interest to stop handling SAMOS and related activities as straight intelligence gathering operations. A plan should be developed urgently to begin treating these programs as essentially overt activities, although possessing certain classified aspects, in order to make them more defensible politically and to capitalize on the contribution which openness in our space activities can make toward achievement

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of our general political objectives. Such a plan would make provision for intelligence use of the product of reconnaissance satellite operations.

The exact degree of openness, and the nature and timing of the political and public relations steps, will need to be carefully worked out by representatives of the interested agencies (Defense, CIA, USIA, and possibly NASA and Dr. Wiesner's office) working closely with the Department. If the present Soviet satellite can be determined to be engaged in reconnaissance operations, this might be a particularly good time to launch a new policy. Our previous secrecy could be plausibly explained on the grounds that we have been in a research and development stage which has now led to an operational capability which we are willing to announce.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the U.S. adopt a more forthright and politically defensible policy with respect to SAMOS and related space activities, keeping classified only those aspects of programs having direct association with intelligence use of the products.
2. That an interdepartmental working group be established immediately to develop a program for implementing the foregoing

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policy. The objective should be to prepare a coordinated plan calling for initial steps prior to the next scheduled launches early in April.

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March 19, 1962

Dear John:

Attached for your review prior to our forthcoming meeting on Thursday, March 22, 1962, is a copy of a proposed DoD directive, "Security and Public Information Policy for Military Space Programs."

Sincerely,



ILLEGIB

Attachment

Honorable John A. McCone

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

March 19, 1962
NUMBER

- DRAFT -

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT (Secret) Security and Public Information Policy for
Military Space Programs

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This directive establishes security and public information policy for military space programs and is applicable to all components of the Department of Defense.

II. GENERAL POLICY

A. Adequate protection of military space programs is vital to the security of the United States. This requires the capability to launch, control, and recover space vehicles without public knowledge of the timing of these actions or of the specific mission involved. It is impractical to selectively protect certain military space programs while continuing an open launch policy for others since to do so would emphasize sensitive projects.

B. The security principle of "need to know" for military space projects must be vigorously enforced within DoD, DoD advisory groups, and by Defense contractors.

C. Rigorous care must be taken to insure that information revealing the identification, mission, scope, or capability of specific military space projects and programs does not appear in unclassified documents and presentations.

D. Unauthorized public discussion by Defense and Defense contractor personnel of the results, effectiveness, capabilities, and potentialities of specific military space projects and programs must be eliminated.

III. PROCEDURES

A. Military space projects and space vehicles henceforth will be identified by means of numerical and alphabetical designators selected and assigned at random; except for boosters, names or nicknames no longer will be used.

1. Military space projects will be identified by a numerical designator.

2. Military space vehicles will be identified by an alphabetical prefix followed by a numerical designator, such as Orbital Vehicle (OV-7), Final Stage Vehicle (FSV-2), etc.

B. The new method of identifying military space vehicles and projects will not be associated with their payload or mission except under the most strict security procedures and will be published in as few documents as possible. Titles of project documents will not refer to the mission or payload associated with the project. Launch or recovery schedules and funding for specific payloads or mission areas will be classified SECRET or higher.

C. All public information news releases on military space programs will be cleared through a single office, and normally no releases will be made until after experiments have been conducted and after preliminary analyses of data have been completed.

D. Preparation and dissemination of over-all reports, development plans, and other documents on military space projects and programs will be severely limited and controlled. Detailed need-to-know justification will be required on the basis of need for specific information, rather than for particular documents. The number of persons authorized a blanket need-to-know will be sharply curtailed and continuously controlled.

RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The heads of all DoD components having responsibilities for military space projects and programs are responsible for insuring adherence to the provisions of this directive.

B. The Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for:

1. Determining and assigning identification nomenclature for all military space projects and vehicles.

2. Maintaining a central registry of all military space project numbers and space vehicle designators.

C. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) is responsible for maintaining the single office through which all public information news releases on DoD space projects and programs will be cleared.

D. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for developing and issuing program and budgetary guidance consistent with the provisions of this directive.

REPECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. This Directive is effective immediately. Existing documentation on military space projects and programs will be superseded by new documents as rapidly as they can be prepared and issued.

B. Every component of the Department will revise its regulations and other instructions to conform with the provisions of this directive.

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Excerpt from Department of State Draft Retitled
"Development of a Political Approach to the SAMOS Problem"
: dated September 1960

Elements of Approach Based on Responsible Openness

Basic views

39. An alternative approach to the SAMOS problem is based on the following views:

a. that the course of action which will be followed by the Soviet Union is difficult to predict and impossible to control;

b. that in addition to avoidance of official protests over reconnaissance satellite activities, the United States has a broader political interest in the reaction of other countries, and that this broader interest related to the contrasting views of the United States and the Soviet Union held by other countries, and the way in which these views affect the political outlook and behavior of such countries;

c. that the U-2 incident and its aftermath and the publicity already accorded the SAMOS program preclude embarking now on an effective policy of silence whereas timely, affirmative measures can be identified and would be practical and realistic; and

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d. that there is little prospect of progress toward effectively inspected and controlled disarmament arrangements with the Soviet Union unless and until Soviet leadership is brought to realize that their policy of secrecy is a wasting asset:

40. On this basis it would appear important to conduct the program from the outset in a manner which would provide a record of responsible openness and non-aggressive intent on the part of this country, and of potentially wide usefulness of observation satellites and the active interest of this country in such uses. This should be done in a low-key, matter-of-fact way. In the short-range, this approach might provide tangible support for any defense of its activities the United States might have to make in response to challenge by another country. In the long-range, the approach might encourage acceptance of or acquiescence in observation satellites as consistent with the peaceful use of outer space.

Use of photographs

41. A central element in constructing this approach of responsible openness would be to refrain from handling photographs acquired by SAMOS satellites as classified intelligence. Intelligence analyses of the photographs

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would, of course, be classified, and no comment would be made on their usefulness for intelligence although no effort would be made to deny intelligence interest. The photographs, however, would also be available for other use.

42. From the standpoint of encouraging international acceptance of or acquiescence in observation satellites, unclassified handling of the photographs would have the basic advantage of being inconsistent with traditional methods of handling intelligence data. Such a course of action would displace with the "nothing to hide" atmosphere of normal, routine business, the air of remoteness and sinister purpose which would otherwise lend prima facie validity to any Soviet charge of hostile intent. It is assumed here that none of the photographs would be handled as classified. This assumption would be subject to re-examination if in practice the intelligence community were able to present adequate justification for classifying any specific photographs. However, it is apparent that there would be a basic advantage in any defense of the program which may become necessary in such a forum as the United Nations to being able to state, without reservation or fear of ready refutation, that no photographs are withheld.

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43. In addition to reflecting responsible openness on the part of this country, making use of the photographs might implicitly and without deliberate exploitation to this end encourage other countries to view openness as inevitable in the space age. Availability of the photographs would make it possible to recognize the self-interest of other countries which may find the information made available by SAMOS politically useful to themselves. This might be true even in the case of some countries which, if confronted with the necessity of taking an official position, might officially frown on the type of activity required to acquire the information. Availability of the photographs would also make it possible to permit their examination by scientists who might find them of considerable interest, and to illustrate effectively the potentialities of observation satellites for use in the performance of public service functions noted in following sections.

44. The approach to handling the photographs would be undertaken as a matter of course, consistent with the well-known policy of the United States of making available the results of its outer space activities. Appropriate inter-

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national bodies having an interest in the photographs would be identified, and relevant photographs would be available to such bodies. Publicity would be avoided. One procedure which suggests itself would be to make the photographs available on request through one or more of the IGY World Data Centers which would be furnished catalogues of the data acquired; this would be consistent with the procedure being followed in the case of photographs taken by the TIROS I meteorological satellite.

45. Utility of this approach would not depend on the quality of the photographs. Generally speaking, it might be preferable not to advertise poor results. However, if initial photography were poor, this would be consistent with the developmental phase of the program. If initial photography were unexpectedly good, as in the case of TIROS I (within the technical limitations of its equipment and methods), it would serve to establish more rapidly the effectiveness of satellites in encouraging "openness" as well as to reflect favorably the capabilities of United States science and technology.

46. The United States would have no way of "proving" it was not withholding some of the photographs. However,

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the United States would not be inhibited from unqualified statements. In any case, it would not appear likely that this question would become a central one from the point of view of countries other than the Soviet Union since the number and character of the photographs made available would make it difficult to perceive any reason why additional photographs should have been withheld. On the other hand, it might not be undesirable for the Soviet Union to believe that it was not fully aware of the extent of United States knowledge.

67. This course of action would not diminish the intelligence value to this country of the photographs themselves. Moreover, two collateral objections have been raised: first, that this course of action would reveal the "state of the art"; and second, that it would reveal to the Soviet Union the state of this country's knowledge about the Soviet Union to the extent that such knowledge is derived from SIGINT. It is possible, of course, that it would be useful to the United States for the Soviet Union to know these things with some, if not complete, certainty. In any case, it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union would be able to make relatively

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good estimates of United States technical capability and reconnaissance accomplishments in this area regardless of availability of the photographs. In the absence of the photographs, there might exist a much greater degree of uncertainty regarding actual capability and over-all effectiveness of SAMDS, but these factors should not prevent a reasonably realistic Soviet assessment of the situation.

Allocation of payloads

48. A companion measure to handling the photographs as outlined above would be to devote a fraction of SAMDS payloads to photographing areas other than the Soviet Union. Initially a portion of each payload might have to be devoted to such purposes. Ultimately, separate payloads might be considered for intelligence and other objectives.

49. This measure may help diminish the impression, which otherwise might result from making available pictures acquired by the satellites, that SAMDS is being used "against" the Soviet Union. By taking and making available photographs of other countries and of the United States itself, it might be possible to support the contention that SAMDS was not being used "against" any country.

50. In selecting other areas to be photographed, an attempt might be made to identify and photograph areas of

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special political interest to certain key countries. The Sino-India border might be an example of the type of area of interest; however, collection of any objective of this character would have to be carefully considered with due regard to the sensitivities involved. An effort might also be made to avoid initially certain countries other than Soviet bloc countries which might be expected to react adversely to revelation of their "secrets".

51. Illustration of the usefulness of observation satellites for scientific and public service functions would be facilitated by photographing areas especially selected for this purpose, an enterprise which would also show that the United States attached importance to accomplishing such functions and had them clearly in view in undertaking development of an observation satellite capability. It would be important to avoid creating undue expectations, and specific commitments to perform public service functions for other countries would have to await the developed capability. Furthermore, it is understood that GAMMA itself is not specifically designed for such a function as mapping. Nonetheless, an effort might be made to engage the interest of other

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countries in the broad potentialities of the program by illustrative use of SAMOS photographs.

52. In connection with such an effort, a useful supplementary measure might be the initiation by appropriate United States Government agencies, without publicity or over-selling, of studies to determine potential specific applications of observation satellites. Thus, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Corps of Engineers might conduct studies related to hydrography, flood control, and water resources utilization; the Bureau of Public Roads, studies related to road planning and construction; the Forest Service and Geological Survey, studies related to their fields of special interest; the Coast and Geodetic Survey, general geodetic studies; the Housing and Home Finance Agency, studies bearing on urban renewal and redevelopment; and ICA, the application of all of the foregoing to underdeveloped areas. Such a program, which could be under the general supervision and coordination of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, might be initiated immediately.

53. A specific project of possibly widespread interest would be the undertaking of a program to produce over a period of time the first complete picture of the entire earth which would give all men the first full view of the planet on which they live.

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54. Any interest on the part of other countries in the successful implementation of the SAMOS program would add significant complications to the situation confronting the Soviet Union in determining whether to undertake political action against the program or in determining whether to attempt physically to destroy the satellites at such time as it should become possible for it to do so.

55. Objections to multi-purpose allocation of SAMOS payloads are found in the facts that the Soviet Union is expected to deploy the bulk of its ICBM force during the next three years and that missile launching sites will be much more accessible to detection by photographic means during the period when they are under construction than after they are completed. Therefore, an urgent need for SAMOS exists at a time when the capability of the system is least and its political problems are, perhaps, greatest. The long-range approach would contemplate two types of efforts to accommodate these immediate circumstances:

a. All excepting a limited percentage of each SAMOS payload would be allocated to meeting intelligence objectives. The exact percentage devoted to other objectives, which would be carefully selected as indicated above, would

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be determined only after detailed analysis of payload capacity and characteristics; however, it is anticipated that a plausible percentage for non-intelligence uses would be substantially less than that devoted to intelligence. Allocations would be influenced by the expectations that general interest might diminish as the program proceeded and that relatively few of the photographs would ever come to the attention of a wide audience.

b. Prompt consideration would be given to the practicability of programming additional satellites to the SANDO program.

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Observation satellites and maintenance of peace.

56. The United States should make clear its intention of placing the type of capability offered by SAMOS, when developed, at the service of the United Nations in support of possible future international arrangements for the control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, warning of surprise attack, and other measures to maintain the peace. SAMOS alone would not constitute an adequate means of verifying disarmament measures or of implementing measures to reduce the threat of war. Nevertheless, such measures should be supported by the most advanced technology available at any time, and the potential capability of SAMOS to survey vast areas and to keep them under surveillance may make a constructive and central contribution. The United States should make its position in this regard clear without at this time putting the United Nations in the position of having to take any action in the matter.

57. The Departments of State and Defense should initiate detailed studies of the application of the type of capability offered by SAMOS to specific possible measures for ensuring

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maintenance of the peace. Studies should also be made of specific types of organizational or administrative arrangements under which the type of capability represented by SAMDS could be placed at the service of the United Nations.

58. In related actions the United States should continue to emphasize the importance of and its interest in ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. In this connection, the United States should reaffirm its proposals to ban the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, its related proposal for prior notification of space vehicle launchings (a measure which would reinforce this country's position of responsible openness and non-aggressive intent), and its offer to undertake technical studies of means which might ultimately achieve the general objective of ensuring the peaceful use of outer space.

Control of the program.

59. Special arrangements would be made to ensure responsible civilian management of the SAMDS program. There are a number of reasons why this would be necessary.

a. The proprietary interest in the program openly exercised by the Strategic Air Command operates to the detriment

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of achieving international acceptance of or acquiescence in the program. As well as underscoring the intelligence functions of the program, present arrangements emphasize the relationship of the program to the conduct of nuclear war and might be subject to interpretation as laying the basis for a first-strike strategy on the part of this country.

b. The wide variety of potential applications of the system for scientific and public service functions go far beyond the competence and interests of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community.

c. Effective control of public information would be necessary, and there is no real prospect of controlling public information concerning the program through normal coordinating procedures.

60. Establishment of a special board of directors under the National Security Council, the National Aeronautics and Space Council (if continued), the Cabinet, or directly under the President might represent a feasible approach. Technical implementation of the program would remain with the Air Force, but ultimate control would be exercised by such a special board on a continuing basis.

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61. The system of control should be flexible enough to permit full support of military needs in time of emergency.

Handling of ferret satellites.

62. The photographic elements of SAMOS appear to present the greatest difficulties since they are most readily understood, correspond most closely to the general concept of reconnaissance, and are the lineal descendants of the U-2. It appears reasonable to believe that the ferret elements of the program will attract less interest, and that if the long-range approach were successful in resolving the problems posed by SAMOS photographic satellites, the result should be acceptance of or acquiescence in the entire program. However, since it is planned that separate satellites will be devoted to development of ferret equipment, it would be advisable at least to prepare guidelines for responding to inquiries. It would be generally consistent with the remainder of the long-range approach to adopt the following line of comment: that one aspect of the program is to develop equipment for electromagnetic detection; that this appears to be technically more difficult than the remainder of the program; that any findings of scientific interest will be made available; and that if

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the capability is successfully developed, it would be available to support international measures to maintain the peace in so far as implementation of such measures might be strengthened by this type of capability.

Conclusions respecting an approach of responsible openness.

63. The central political problem of an approach of responsible openness lies not in any difficulty of identifying affirmative measures but rather in ensuring implementation of such measures in a low key and matter-of-fact manner which would add as little provocation as possible to what under existing international conditions might be considered the basically provocative act of launching SAKDS satellites. The advantage of the approach is that it would afford a means of better equipping the United States to deal with the issue that SAKDS may become regardless of this country's efforts to avoid making it an issue.

64. Although an approach of responsible openness would be designed to provide a defensible position in both the short and long-range, it should not be regarded as primarily defensive. On the contrary, the essence of the approach lies in its view of observation satellites as a natural and logical step in

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the progression of achievements concerned with the use of outer space. In the context of the present formative stage of principles and practices in outer space, an attempt to treat SAKD3 as a straight intelligence operation would not appear likely to encourage international acceptance of or acquiescence in this new tool as consistent with the peaceful use of outer space. The demonstration of responsible openness, non-aggressive intent, and potentially broad usefulness of observation satellites contemplated by the long-range approach might support full exploitation of observation satellites and assist materially in the establishment of principles and practices in outer space of continuing advantage to this country as well as others.

PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS

65. The Executive Branch approach to the problem should be coordinated with congressional leaders in an effort to ensure consistent handling of the program by all responsible United States officials. It would also be important to undertake coordination directly with principal allies and with NATO.

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